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The Legality of Military Bases in Non-Self-
Governing Territory: the Case of United
States Bases in Puerto Rico
JOHN QUIGLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A state administering a non-self-governing territory is obliged to act
in the best interests of the local population. Since this norm emerged in
the early twentieth century, regulation has not been uniform as to
whether an administering state may establish military bases in the non-
self-governing territory. An administering state that establishes military
bases not to defend the non-self-governing territory, but for its own pur-
poses, may violate its obligations to the non-self-governing territory.
Such bases can cause economic harm by diverting land and sea areas
from traditional uses. They may involve the non-self-governing territory
against its will in military conflicts with neighboring states. They may
impair the non-self-governing territory's opportunity of achieving self-de-
termination because the administering state may be reluctant to jeopard-
ize its bases.
This article asks whether establishment of military bases in a non-
self-governing territory is consistent with an administering state's obliga-
tions to the non-self-governing territory. It analyzes applicable customary
law, developed largely through the League of Nations and United Na-
tions. It examines United States military bases in Puerto Rico as a case
study, to permit a more detailed examination of the question of whether
bases are used for the administering state's benefit, and of the question of
whether a territory is non-self-governing.
Finally, the article examines the state responsibility of an adminis-
tering state that establishes unlawful military bases towards the people of
a non-self-governing territory. Here it draws on the Puerto Rico case to
explore the damage that may be caused to a non-self-governing territory
by military bases.
II. QUESTION OF WHETHER MILITARY BASES VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE
POPULATION OF A NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORY
A state holding a non-self-governing territory must assist it in achiev-
Professor of Law, Ohio State University. The author is grateful to his colleague Prof.
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ing self-determination.1 Until that occurs, the state must so administer
the territory as to maximize the interests of the local population.2 As a
corollary, it may not exploit the territory for its own benefit.' An example
of use for the benefit of the administering state is South Africa's intensive
mining in Namibia, in an apparent effort to extract valuable minerals
before granting Namibia independence. This action has been condemned
as a violation of the rights of the people of a non-self-governing territory.'
A. The "Sacred Trust" Norm
Establishment of military bases to benefit the administering state
may conflict with the right of the population of a non-self-governing terri-
tory to have it administered for its benefit. That right emerged in the late
nineteenth century.5 The European colonial states recognized an obliga-
tion to benefit colonized populations. Britain called it the "white man's
burden,"" France the mission civiliatrice. That obligation is reflected in
an 1885 treaty regarding the Congo: "All the powers exercising rights of
sovereignty or influence in the said territories agree to protect the indige-
nous populations and to ameliorate their moral and material conditions of
existence."7
1. League of Nations
This obligation was expanded and regulated by the League of Na-
tions, which decided that states taking colonies from Turkey and Ger-
many in World War I had no right to accept them as colonies.8 The
League determined that the international community carried an obliga-
tion to these territories, and that administering states bore a "sacred
trust of civilization" to benefit the local population, and to aid it in
achieving self-determination.
The League concretized this concept in a system it called
"mandates":
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late
war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which for-
merly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
1. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2.
2. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.
3. A. MARGALITH, THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATES 1 (1930).
4. G.A. Res. 37/233A, preambular para. 18, Dec. 20, 1982, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
51) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983) (Vote: 120-0-23).
5. A. MARGALITH, supra note 3, at 50-68.
6. R. ANAND, NEW STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1972). The phrase is that of
Rudyard Kipling.
7. General Act of the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries of Austria-Hungary, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain,
Sweden-Norway, and Turkey (and the United States) respecting the Congo, Feb. 26, 1885,
art. 6, 165 (1885), CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 485 (C. Parry ed. 1978).
8. A. MARGALITH, supra note 3, at 1-17.
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world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and
that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in
this Covenant.9
2. American States
A "sacred trust" norm emerged among the American states as well.
The United States recognized that obligation towards Cuba, over which it
acquired jurisdiction in 1898. The U.S. President said that the United
States would "give aid and direction to its people to form a government
for themselves."1 The U.S. Supreme Court characterized Cuba as
territory held in trust for the inhabitants of Cuba to whom it right-
fully belongs and to whose exclusive control it will be surrendered
when a stable government shall have been established by their volun-
tary action."
At the outset of World War II, the American states established an
international commission to administer any European-held Western
Hemisphere territory over which Germany might try to assume adminis-
tration. They decided that such administration should be carried out "for
the benefit of the region under administration, with a view to its welfare
and progress." They included one specific guarantee of rights, obliging
the prospective inter-state administration to "guarantee freedom of con-
science and worship. "12
3. United Nations
The United Nations Charter identifies pursuit of self-determination
of peoples as a purpose of the Organization. It views the right to self-
determination as necessary not only to protect peoples, but as well "to
strengthen universal peace." The Charter takes the position that peace
cannot be secure so long as peoples are deprived of their right to self-
determination.13
Consonant with its emphasis on self-determination, the Charter ex-
panded the applicability of the "sacred trust" norm. It applied it to all
states administering non-self-governing territory. Article 73 provided:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities
9. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, para. 1. 2 F. ISRAEL, MAJOR PEACE TREATIES
OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967 1274, 1283 (1967).
10. Quoted in Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 120, 21 S.Ct. 302, 306, 45 L.Ed. 448, 455
(1901).
11. Id.
12. Convention on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Posses-
sions in the Americas (Act of Havana), July 30, 1940, arts. 3-4, 56 Stat. 1273, T.S. No. 977,
161 U.N.T.S. 254, 3 Bevans 623. For diplomatic correspondence leading to adoption of the
Convention, see 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940 180-256 (1961).
13. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2.
1988
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet at-
tained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that
the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and
accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost,
within the system of international peace and security established by
the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these
territories."
As one method of enforcing the "sacred trust" obligation, the Charter
established a system equivalent to the League's mandate system, which it
called trusteeship. States were invited to place their non-self-governing
territories under supervision of a Trusteeship Council.1" The Charter re-
quired a "trustee" state
to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advance of
the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive develop-
ment towards self-government or independence...'0
States accepting trusteeship remained bound by their Article 73 "sacred
trust" obligation.
17
B. Legality of Military Bases Under the "Sacred Trust" Norm
Existence of a "sacred trust" norm raises the question of whether an
administering state may use a non-self-governing territory to its military
benefit.
1. League of Nations Practice
The League of Nations prohibited administering states from main-
taining military bases in mandate territory. But it did not apply that
principle consistently.
In resolving this issue, the League distinguished on the basis of
whether a mandate territory was an "A," "B," or "C" mandate. The
League designated as "B" and "C" mandates those it deemed less ready
for independence than those it designated "A" mandates. "B" mandates
were those in Central Africa. "C" mandates were Pacific Ocean territo-
ries, plus South West Africa. The only "A" mandates, those territories
considered closest to independence, were Palestine and Syria. s
The Covenant mentioned military bases only with respect to "B" ter-
ritories. It required the mandatory state to "prevent. . .establishment of
fortifications or military and naval bases."1 9 That language was evidently
intended to apply as well to "C" territories, because the League's agree-
ments with mandatory states regarding all "B" and "C" territories pro-
14. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.
15. U.N. CHARTER, art. 75.
16. U.N. CHARTER, art. 76(b).
17. Yearbook of the United Nations: 1946-47, at 570 (1947).
18. A. MARGALITH, supra note 3, at 82-83.
19. COVENANT, supra note 9, art. 22, para. 5.
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hibited military bases.2 0 For example, the League's agreement with New
Zealand respecting German Samoa, a "C" mandate, provided: "[N]o mili-
tary or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the
territory."" When Japan established fortifications in certain of its "C"
territories in the Pacific Ocean, in violation of similar provisions, protests
were made to the League's Mandates Commission.
22
With "A" mandates, however, military bases were not prohibited.
The League's agreement with Great Britain for Syria authorized military
bases. This limited their purpose to local defense: "The Mandatory may
maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence.""'
The League's agreement with Great Britain for Palestine did not au-
thorize military bases but included provisions that assumed British mili-
tary activity in Palestine. An article limiting Britain's recruitment of local
militia provided,
"Nothing in this article shall preclude the administration of Palestine
from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the
Mandatory in Palestine. The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times
to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of
armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.
24
Britain established a naval base in Palestine at Haifa.2 5 The League's ex-
ception regarding Palestine is likely attributable to Britain's strong inter-
est in providing military protection for approaches to the Suez Canal.
2. United Nations Practice
Practice under the United Nations Charter rejects the permissibility
of military bases in a non-self-governing territory to benefit the adminis-
tering state.
a. Charter Provisions
The negotiating history of the Charter provisions on trusteeship
shows an intent to prohibit such bases. Drafters rejected a proposal that
administering states establish military bases only with Security Council
approval. The concern underlying the proposal was that bases might be
established for the benefit of the administering state.27 It was argued in
opposition to this proposal that supervision of trusteeship came under
20. Q. WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONs 471 (1930).
21. Mandate for German Samoa, art. 4, in A. MARGALITH, supra note 3, at 211.
22. H. HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TRUSTEESHIP 69, 210 (1948). Akzin, The
Palestine Mandate in Practice, 25 IOWA L. REV. 32, 34 (1939).
23. Syria and the Lebanon, art. 2, in Q. WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 608. "Its" refers to
"territory," meaning that Britain was forbidden to establish bases for its own purposes.
24. PALESTINE CONST., art. 17, in Q. WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 603-604.
25. Akzin, supra note 22, at 34.
26. S. ZEBEL, BALFOUR: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 240 (1973).
27. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMEN-
TARY AND DOCUMENTS 513 (1969).
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Security Council jurisdiction.2 8 It was anticipated that the Security Coun-
cil would ensure that administering states not establish military bases for
their own benefit.
The final Charter language was silent on military bases. The intent
was to permit military bases, but for two purposes only. The first was
defense of the non-self-governing territory, since lack of fortifications in
League of Nations mandate territories had facilitated Axis takeovers. 9
The second was participation in international peacekeeping, since non-
self-governing territories were expected to participate in the peacekeeping
envisaged by the Charter."0
The General Assembly has construed the Article 73 "sacred trust"
norm to prohibit military bases established to benefit the administering
state. It finds military bases inconsistent with the obligation to benefit
the local population and to move a territory towards self-determination:
Member States shall oppose all military activities and arrangements
by colonial and occupying Powers in the Territories under colonial
and racist domination, as such activities and arrangements constitute
an obstacle to the full implementation of the Declaration, and shall
intensify their efforts with a view to securing the immediate and un-
conditional withdrawal from colonial Territories of military bases and
installations of colonial Powers."'
b. General Assembly Restrictions in Trusteeship Agreements.
In agreements with states placing non-self-governing territories
under trusteeship, the General Assembly has permitted military bases.
However, the purpose is limited to: (1) defense of the non-self-governing
territory; (2) participation in United Nations peacekeeping. The Assem-
bly's trusteeship agreement with the United Kingdom for Tanganyika is
typical. The United Kingdom was given the right,
to establish naval, military and air bases, to erect fortifications, to sta-
tion and employ his own forces in Tanganyika and to take all such
other measures as are in his opinion necessary for the defence of Tan-
28. U.N. CHARTER, art. 83; R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945, 836 (1958).
29. H. HALL, supra note 22, at 68-69.
30. It was on this basis that the United Kingdom and Australia proposed that trustee
States be permitted to station troops in trust territories. R. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 836.
31. G.A. Res. 35/118, Annex: Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Decla-
ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, art. 9, Dec. 11,
1980, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981); reprinted in 1983
U.N.Y.B. 1057, (Vote: 120-6-20). Cf. G.A. Res. 41/405, para. 1, Oct. 31, 1986, Advance Text
of Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at Its 41st Session from 16
September to 19 December 1987, Press Release GA/7463, Jan. 12, 1987, at 559, reported in
U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Feb. 1987, at 130. (Vote: 124-13-15). The Special Committee on
Decolonization has similarly characterized bases as an impediment to self-determination
and called for their removal. See, e.g., Resolution, paras. 11-12, Aug. 8, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.109/584 (1979).
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ganyika and for ensuring that the territory plays its part in the main-
tenance of international peace and security."3
Thus, the United Kingdom was not authorized to establish military bases
for its own benefit.
c. General Assembly Criticism of Particular Bases
The General Assembly has on several occasions criticized administer-
ing states for bases in non-self-governing territory. It has condemned
South Africa for maintaining military bases in Namibia."3 In 1960 it criti-
cized Belgium for using bases in its trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi to
send troops into the Congo. The Assembly called on Belgium "to refrain
from using the Territory [Ruanda-Urundi-J.Q.] as a base, whether for
internal or external purposes, for the accumulation of arms or armed
forces not strictly required for the purpose of maintaining public order in
the Territory.
34
3. Conclusion as to Permissibility of Military Bases
The "sacred trust" norm prohibits military bases for the benefit of an
administering state in a non-self-governing territory. This prohibition
precludes not only bases whose purpose is offensive but those designed
for defense of the administering state. Bases even for defense of the ad-
ministering state involve a use of the non-self-governing territory for a
purpose that does not benefit the local population.
III. QUESTION OF WHETHER BASES ARE DESIGNED TO BENEFIT THE
ADMINISTERING STATE
If an administering state establishes military bases in a non-self-gov-
erning territory, it may assert that the aim is to defend that territory
from attack. A base may serve both to defend that territory and to fur-
ther interests of the administering state. This mixture of motives is illus-
trated by the United States bases in Puerto. The United States has ac-
knowledged that its bases serve its own interests, though it views benefits
flowing to Puerto Rico as well.
The United States has administered Puerto Rico since 1898.38 It first
32. Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Tanganyika, art. 5(c), 1947 U.N.Y.B.
193.
33. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 35/227A, para. 21, March 6, 1981, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48)
at 40, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981); reprinted in 1981 U.N.Y.B. 1149 ("strongly condemns
South Africa for its ever-increasing military build-up in Namibia"). (Vote: 114-0-22). See
also G.A. Res. 36/121A, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982);
reprinted in 1981 U.N.Y.B. 1154 ("condemns South Africa for...the massive militarization
of Namibia") (Vote: 120-0-27). On South Africa's military presence in Namibia, see I. DORE,
THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND NAMIBIA 168 (1985).
34. G.A. Res. 1579, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961)
(Vote: 61-9-23).
35. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, Spain-United States, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343.
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established military bases there in 1938, in a program of founding naval
bases "for purposes of national defense" in various of its "territories and
possessions. 36 In that year Congress appropriated $30 million to con-
struct air and naval bases in Puerto Rico.
3 7
The United States governed Puerto Rico at that time through ap-
pointed governors. In 1939 President Roosevelt appointed an Admiral,
William D. Leahy, to govern Puerto Rico, because of base construction
plans.3 No local authority had a role in the base-construction decision.
A. Extent of Military Use of Puerto Rico
In 1943 the U.S. Assistant Secretary of War characterized Puerto
Rico as "largely a garrison."8 9 Between 1939 and 1944 the United States
Navy had acquired land for base construction on Vieques, an off-shore
island of Puerto Rico. On the western end of the main island, it had built
Borinquen Fields (later Ramey Air Base), and on the eastern end
Roosevelt Roads Naval Base, which it equipped to accommodate the Brit-
ish fleet should Britain fall to Germany.40 It had built another naval base
in San Juan harbor.4'
A naval ammunition depot on Vieques that the Navy had closed after
World War II was re-activated following the United States' 1962 confron-
tation with Cuba over the stationing of Soviet missiles there.' By 1966
the U.S. Navy was using 44,249 acres in Puerto Rico.43 The Roosevelt
Roads base became one of the largest naval bases in the world" and "one
of the most exclusive and sophisticated control centers for weapons train-
ing in the world."'45 It uses an "electromagnetic environment" for military
training that extends into the ocean, covering 194,000 square miles that,
according to the U.S. Navy, cannot be duplicated at any other location to
which it has access.' 6 Roosevelt Roads has docking facilities for United
States nuclear-armed vessels, which it harbors there.
36. Pub. L. No. 528, sec. 10(a), 52 Stat. 401 (1938).
37. THE PUERTO RICANs: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 185 (K. Wagenheim ed. 1973). N.Y.
Times, Nov. 12, 1939, at 43, col. 5 (on base construction).
38. THE PUERTO RicAs' supra note 37, at 185. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1939, at 42, col. 4.
N.Y. Times, June 7, 1939, at 2, col. 2.
39. A Bill to Provide for the Withdrawal of U.S. Sovereignty Over the Island of Puerto
Rico and for the Recognition of Its Independence, 1943: Hearings on S. 952 Before the
Senate Comm. on Territories and Insular Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1943) (state-
ment of John McCloy, Ass't Sec. of War).
40. R. CARR, PUERTO Rico: A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 310 (1984).
41. Hearings on S. 952, supra note 39, at 15 (statement of Sen. Taft).
42. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 310-311.
43. United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, Inventory of
Federal Agencies with Offices in Puerto Rico, in Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Back-
ground Studies 947 (1966
44. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 310.
45. Id. at 311 (citing U.S. Navy documents).
46. Id.
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By the 1970s, the U.S. Navy had acquired title to 76% of Vieques
Island, which is 20 miles long by four miles wide.4 7 It upgraded its facili-
ties there in the 1980s.
4 8
While most U.S. military use of Puerto Rico is done by the Navy, its
Army and Air Force have established smaller bases. The Army estab-
lished there its Antilles Command in the late 1930s and by 1966 used
14,660 acres of land.49
The Air Force began operations in Puerto Rico in 1939. In 1952 it
established there the 72nd Bomb Wing of its Strategic Air Command, 0
which came to use 4169 acres."' The Air Force withdrew the Command in
the early 1970s but used its Puerto Rico bases for exercises in the 1980s.52
Because of the scope of United States military activity in Puerto
Rico, the governor of Puerto Rico described it in 1982 as a "land super
carrier.'
5 3
B. Defense of the Administering State
Depending on its own military situation, an administering state may
find it useful to employ bases in the non-self-governing territory for its
own defense. This consideration has been prominent in U.S. military pol-
icy in Puerto Rico.
1. Protection of Panama Canal
In 1939 the U.S.-appointed governor of Puerto Rico called the bases
"the keystone of our eastern defense." A major purpose of bases then
under construction was protection of the Panama Canal.55 Stated Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt:
When the island [Puerto Rico] was brought under our flag, the Pan-
ama Canal had not yet been dug, and the airplane had not yet been
invented .... When the present war became imminent, however, it
was obvious that the chain of islands... formed a vast natural shield
for the Panama Canal, suited in distance and conformation to the
uses of the military plane. And of this island shield, Puerto Rico is the
47. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 837 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 305
(1982).
48. Lidin, Navy's Signal Tower for Carib Upgraded, San Juan Star, May 6, 1983, at 1,
col. 1.
49. U.S.-Puerto Rico Commission, supra note 43, at 915.
50. Strategic Air Command, General Order No. 32, 1952, in U.S.-Puerto Rico Commis-
sion, id. at 914.
51. Id. at 915.
52. Turner, Ramey Part of Response to Russians, San Juan Star, Apr. 25, 1983, at 1,
col. 2.
53. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 315 (quoting Feb. 1, 1982, speech of Gov. Romero-
Barcel6).
54. Gov. Blanton Winship (1934-1939), quoted in N.Y. Times, May 14, 1939, at 42, col.
4. See similar comments of Gen. George Marshall, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1939, at 3, col. 7.
55. The Puerto Ricans, supra note 37, at 185.
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Puerto Rico became "an Atlantic Gibraltar for defense of the Panama
Canal.""7
2. Protection of the Eastern Seaboard of the United States
The U.S. Navy considers Puerto Rico vital for defense of the eastern
United States." This factor was cited by a United States federal judge to
deny a requested injunction to suspend Navy exercises on Vieques Island
in Romero-Barcelb v. Brown.5 The Governor of Puerto Rico, acting on
behalf of Puerto Rico, had sued the U.S. Secretary of Defense, to stop
exercises on and around Vieques Island, on the grounds of harm to the
environment. Puerto Rico alleged violation of environmental protection
statutes. U.S. District Judge Juan R. Torruella found that the Navy had
violated such statutes but denied the injunction, citing the importance to
the United States of the exercises. Judge Torruella said:
The Atlantic Fleet is responsible for providing naval forces through-
out a geographic area that extends from as far north as the Arctic, to
as far south as the Antarctic, as far east as Turkey and as far west as
Mexico."'
Its most important function, Judge Torruella said, is to protect sea lanes
used by U.S. vessels:
From an economic and defense standpoint, the United States is an
island which must import 90% of its strategic materials over the sea
lanes of the World. Petroleum is the single most important commod-
ity moved by sea, the primary sources in the Atlantic seaboard being
the Middle East, and secondarily, South America. These sea lanes are
also of vital importance in allowing the United States to meet its in-
ternational obligations with 41 of the 43 nations with which it has
mutual defense treaties. 61
56. An Act to Amend the Act to Provide a Civil Government for Puerto Rico, 1944:
Hearings on S. 1407 Before the House Comm. on Insular Affairs, 78th Cong., 2d sess. 14-15
(letter of Pres. Franklin Roosevelt). Roosevelt's 1941-46 governor of Puerto Rico also saw
Puerto Rico as protection against threats to the Panama Canal:
The source was Germany, the objective was the Panama Canal, and the direc-
tion was through the Caribbean island arc from Florida to Trinidad. In this arc
Puerto Rico was central. Bases there were, in the strict sense, strategic and
essential. Puerto Rico therefore had to be maintained as a controlled and, if
possible, friendly base.
R. TUGWELL, THE ART OF POLITICS 150 (1958).
57. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1943, at 7, col. 1.
58. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 310. Immediately after World War II and prior to the
Cold War, some U.S. officials thought that Puerto Rico would no longer be necessary in U.S.
military strategy. R. TUGWELL, supra note 56, at 150-151.
59. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. 646 (D. P.R. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, remanded in part, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcel6, 456 U.S. 305, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982).
60. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 708.
61. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 707.
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C. Military Training Exercises
Because major military exercises disrupt civilian activity, a non-self-
governing territory may provide a more convenient location than sites in
the administering state, since citizens of the territory are less able effec-
tively to object.
The U. S. Navy has used Puerto Rico for its own exercises and for
N.A.T.O. exercises.6 2 A U.S. military commander wrote of Vieques Island:
Actually the island is a part of Puerto Rico, but the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps had established something of a squatters right over it.
They used it as a target area for the long guns of the Caribbean Fleet
and as a place where the marines could practice their amphibious
landings."
The United States military finds Puerto Rico more appropriate for
training than other available areas for military exercises using sophisti-
cated weaponry:
The island of Vieques is the only place presently available wherein the
Atlantic Fleet can conduct the full range of exercises under conditions
similar to simulated combat. It is the only place which possesses the
potential or existing capability to conduct combined exercises involv-
ing air-to-ground ordnances delivery, Marine amphibious assaults,
anti-submarine warfare, surface-to-air missiles, close support bom-
bardment, and electronic warfare; in short everything that a battle
group would undertake to secure our sea lanes from interdiction by
hostile forces."
Judge Torruella, who made that finding, stated that "the continued use of
Vieques by Defendant Navy for naval training activities is essential to the
defense of the Nation."" He therefore denied the injunction requested by
Puerto Rico:
[T]he injunctive relief sought would cause grievous, and perhaps ir-
reparable harm, not only to Defendant Navy, but to the general wel-
fare of this Nation. It is abundantly clear from the evidence in the
record, as well as by our taking judicial notice of the present state of
World affairs, that the training that takes place in Vieques is vital to
the defense of the interests of the United States.66
On appeal in that case, the U.S. Supreme Court cited with approval this
finding of fact.6 7 Noting that the Navy had used Vieques Island for weap-
ons training for many years, it concurred as to the unique utility of Vie-
62. Vieques Fishermen Fight Back (interview with Carlos Zenon, President, Fisher-
men's Association of Vieques), 1 PUERTO RICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16, 18 (no. 2,
1978).
63. W. HARRIS, PUERTO Rico's FIGHTING 65TH U.S. INFANTRY 15 (1980).
64. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 708.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 707.
67. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 310.
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ques Island for training exercises: "Currently all Atlantic Fleet vessels as-
signed to the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean are required to
complete their training at Vieques because it permits a full range of exer-
cises under conditions similar to combat."'
The United States military has used Puerto Rico not only for mili-
tary training aimed at defense of the United States, but as well for train-
ing in intervention, taking advantage of Puerto Rico's situation as a Car-
ibbean island. In the early 1980s the U.S. Atlantic Command conducted
exercises in and around Puerto Rico to simulate the type of landing that
it carried out in Grenada in 1983. The exercise was called Ocean Ven-
ture." Its objective was to install a "government friendly to America" in a
Caribbean island state that was "exporting terrorist activities to neigh-
boring islands."' 0 In its 1983 invasion of Grenada, the U.S. Navy assem-
bled part of its assault force in Puerto Rico." The U.N. Special Commit-
tee on Decolonization has expressed concern about U.S. use of military
facilities in Puerto Rico as part of its Central America policy.
72
IV. QUESTION OF WHETHER A TERRITORY IS SELF-GOVERNING
The question of whether a territory is self-governing may not be
clear. An administering state's power with respect to military use of the
territory is a factor relevant in answering that question. If an administer-
ing state has power of military use, that fact casts doubt on whether the
territory is self-governing. This section uses Puerto Rico to examine the
question of how it is determined whether a territory is non-self-governing.
When the United Nations established supervision over non-self-gov-
erning territories, the United States listed Puerto Rico as non-self-gov-
erning.7 1 Beginning in 1946, it annually submitted to the United Nations
information about Puerto Rico, as required by Article 73 of the United
Nations Charter.7" Submission of these reports constituted recognition by
the United States that Puerto Rico was non-self-governing. The United
68. Id. at 307.
69. Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1983, at A24, col. 3. For a view that Ocean Venture 1981 was
intended as practice for intervention in Grenada, see London Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at 5, col.
1. See also Quigley, The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger than Fiction, 18
INTER-AMERICAN L. R. 271, at 318-319 (1986-87).
70. C. SEARLE, GRENADA: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST DESTABILIZATION 37-38 (1983).
71. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
72. Resolution, para. 5, Aug. 24, 1983, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/751 (1983), reported in U.N.
MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1984, at 83 (Vote: 10-2-10) (links strengthening of the U.S. mili-
tary apparatus in P.R. with U.S. policy in Central America).
73. 1946-1947 U.N.Y.B. 572. The listing had been requested by G.A. Res. 9, Feb. 9,
1946, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of Its First
Session from 10 January to 14 February 1946 13, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946).
74. Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During the Second Part of Its First
Session from 23 October to 15 December 1946, G.A. Res. 66, preambular para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add.1, at 124 (1947). Axtmayer, Non-Self-Governing Territories and the Constitutive
Process of the United Nations: A General Analysis and the Case Study of Puerto Rico,
45(3-4) REVISTA JURfDICA DE LA UNIV. DE P.R. 211, 236 (1976).
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States approved a 1946 General Assembly resolution that listed all non-
self-governing territories held by member states. The resolution included
Puerto Rico.75 Thus, at that period the United States' position was that
Puerto Rico was non-self-governing.
Since Puerto Rico was non-self-governing when the bases were
founded, their establishment violated the United States' obligations as an
administering state. This illegal situation could be corrected, at least for
the future, however, if Puerto Rico were to achieve self-governing status
and then to agree to the bases. A state has the right to permit other
states to establish military bases.76 While international law provides guid-
ance in determining whether a territory is non-self-governing, application
of the law to specific situations is hazardous.
A. 1950-52 Legislation on Puerto Rico's Status
The position of the United States is that it made Puerto Rico self-
governing in 1952. This section examines that position. In 1953 the
United States informed the United Nations that it would stop sending
annual reports regarding Puerto Rico. It asserted that Puerto Rico was no
longer non-self-governing. 77 The General Assembly discussed the United
States communication and adopted by a narrow vote Resolution 748, in
which it agreed with the United States' assertion that Puerto Rico had
become self-governing." It,
recognize[d] that... the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
have been invested with attributes of political sovereignty which
clearly identify the status of self-government attained by the Puerto
Rican people as that of an autonomous political entity.. . ." and "con-
sider[ed] that, due to these circumstances, the Declaration regarding
Non-Self-Governing Territories and the provisions established under
it in Chapter XI of the Charter [Article 73-J.Q.] can no longer be
applied to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.71
The basis for the United States' assertion that Puerto Rico had be-
come self-governing was that in 1950 the U. S. Congress adopted P.L.
600, authorizing the drafting in Puerto Rico of a constitution, to be ap-
75. G.A. Res. 66, supra note 73.
76. See, e.g., Defense Agreement, art. 2, Sept. 26, 1953, Spain-United States, 4 U.S.T.
1895, 207 U.N.T.S. 83 (providing for U.S. military bases in Spain).
77. Report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, 8
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15), U.N. Doc. A/2465 (1953). On events surrounding this submis-
sion, see Garcia Muffiz, Puerto Rico and the United States: The United Nations Role 1953-
1975, 53 REvISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIV. DE P.R. 1, at 13-18 (1984); and Axtmayer, supra note
74, at 238-46.
78. G.A. Res. 748, Nov. 27, 1953, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/2630
(1953). Vote: 26-16-18. Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Trying to Gain Dig-
nity and Maintain Culture, 11 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 211, at 278 (1981).
79. G.A. Res. 748, supra note 78, para. 5. On U.N. discussion leading to adoption of
Res. 748, see Garcia Mufliz, supra note 77, at 26-48.
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proved by referendum there.80 The constitution so drafted would be sub-
ject to the approval of the U.S. Congress."1 A constitution was drafted by
a constituent assembly. That constitution used the term "common-
wealth" to describe Puerto Rico.82 The constitution was approved by a
referendum in Puerto Rico and then by the U.S. Congress, which, how-
ever, demanded certain changes as condition of its approval.8"
States voting against Resolution 748 argued that the 1950-1952
changes left Puerto "non-self-governing" and that the 1952 referendum
offered a choice only between the new proposed arrangement and the sta-
tus quo, leaving no option of independence."
They also cited the unlimited power of the U.S. government to legis-
late for Puerto Rico.8 Despite adoption of the Puerto Rico Constitution,
United States law retained an earlier provision that federal U.S. legisla-
tion applies in Puerto Rico.8 There was no requirement that Puerto Rico
accept existing or future federal legislation.7
B. United Nations Standards for Self-Determination
A strong indication of the customary law standard is provided by cri-
teria formulated by the General Assembly to determine whether a terri-
tory has attained self-determination. The Assembly has drawn up a list of
factors.88
80. Pub. L. No. 81-600, July 3, 1950, 64 Stat. 319, 48 U.S.C. 731b, 731c (1950).
81. 48 U.S.C. 731d.
82. PUERTO Rico CONST. art. 1, sec. 1, re-produced as appendix in Magruder, The Com-
monwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 20-33 (1953).
83. H.R.J. Res. 567, 66 Stat. 327 (1952). For a fuller account of the 1950-1952 legisla-
tion and adoption of the Puerto Rico constitution, see W. REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND THE
INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW ROLES IN AssOCIATION 31-35 (1975); J. TORRUELLA, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND PUERTO Rico: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 152-159 (1985);
Magruder, supra note 82, at 1-33; Mufliz, supra note 77, at 8-9.
84. Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 278. See also Mufliz, supra note 77, at 41-43.
85. Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 278; Rodriguez-Orellana, In Contemplation of Micro-
nesia: The Prospects for the Decolonization of Puerto Rico Under International Law, 18 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. R. 457, 460-461 (1987). Congress' power is limited in certain respects by
the U.S. Constitution, as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651, 100 S.Ct. 1929, 64 L.Ed.2d 587 (1980), but that limitation is irrelevant for present pur-
poses. The significant point is that the three branches of the U.S. government collectively
hold plenary legislative power over Puerto Rico. On limitations imposed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court on the basis of the U.S. Constitution, see Laughlin, The Burger Court and the
United States Territories, 36 U. FLA. L.R. 755-816 (1984).
86. 48 U.S.C. 734, construed in Feliciano v. U.S., 297 F.Supp. 1356, 1361 (D. P.R. 1969).
87. Caribtow Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 493 F.2d
1064, 1066 (1st Cir. 1974). W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 36. Ortiz-Alvarez, The Compact
between Puerto Rico and the United States: Its Nature and Effects, 24 REVISTA DE DER-
ECHO PUERTORRIQUE&O, nos. 91-92, 179, 258-259 (1984-85).
88. The factors appear in two resolutions: (1) G.A. Res. 742, Nov. 27, 1953, 8 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 21, U.N.Doc. A/2630 (1953); (2) G.A. Res. 1541, Dec. 15, 1960, 15
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
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1. Indigenous Legislation
One factor is "enactment of laws for the Territory by an indigenous
body."89 While Puerto Rico enacts laws on many important topics, s ° it
has less legislative power than is typical of entities in "free association."'
U.S. courts have power to construe Puerto Rico's statutes, regardless of
the construction given by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, if they find
construction by the latter "inescapably wrong."" s The U.S. Congress re-
tained the power to change the law applicable in Puerto Rico.9 3 Puerto
Rico remains in United States law a "territory,"' 4 and Congress has un-
limited power to legislate for territories."
89. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 88, Annex, Part II: Factors Indicative of the Attainment
of Other Separate Systems of Self-Government, para. C(1). For agreement that it is Part II
of Res. 742 that is applicable to Puerto Rico, see Garcia Mufkiz, supra note 77, at 49.
90. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 33-34.
91. Accord Axtmayer, supra note 74, at 246. Several U.N. member states so asserted in
opposing the draft of G.A. Res. 748; Garcia Muftiz, supra note 77, at 42, 49-50; Note, Puerto
Rico: Colony or Commonwealth?, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTr'L L. & POL. 115, 130-131 (1973). Berrios
Martinez, Self-Determination and Independence: The Case of Puerto Rico, 67 PRoc. AM.
Soc. INT'L L. 11, 13-15 (1973). Contra W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 49, 113 (that despite
defects, status is one of "free associated state"). For analysis of relations between "associ-
ated states" and metropolitan states, see T. FRANCK, CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES BY SEMI-
AUTONOMOUS STATES 7-26 (1978). Unlike most such states, Puerto Rico does not, for exam-
ple, have the right to establish an exclusive economic zone around its shore, that power
being retained by the United States. Id. at 28-29.
92. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 43, 91 S.Ct. 156, 157, 27 L.Ed.2d 174, 177
(1970).
93. Ortiz-Alvarez, supra note 87, at 258-259. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 83. J. TOR-
RUELLA, supra note 83, at 167-195, 200.
94. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 469-470, 99 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 61 L.Ed.2d 1, 7
(1979). Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 651, in which the Court stated: "Congress, which is
empowered under the Territory Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST., art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2,
to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory... belonging to the
United States,' may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a rational
basis for its actions." The U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of Puerto Rico as a "territory"
deprives of any force the dictum that Puerto Rico since 1952 is not a "territory." The Dis-
trict Court of Puerto Rico had stated: "[Tihe Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States is no longer applicable on the basis that Puerto Rico is a possession, depen-
dency or territory subject to the plenary power of Congress. But it continues to be applica-
ble to Puerto Rico as part of the compact referred to." Mora v. Torres, 113 F.Supp. 309, 319
(D. P.R. 1953), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir.
1953).
95. "The Congress shall have Power to... make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONSTITU-
TION, art. IV, sec. 3. construed in Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 377-378
(1949) ("While ... great respect is to be paid to the enactments of a territorial legislature by
all courts.., the position of the state [state of the United States-J.Q.] as sovereign over
matters not ruled by the Constitution requires a deference to state legislative action beyond
that required for the laws of a territory. A territory is subject to congressional regulation.")
In light of that statement, which has never been repudiated by the Court, the view of the
U.S. District Court in Mora v. Mejias, 115 F.Supp. 610, 612 (D. P.R. 1953) that "Puerto
Rico is, under the terms of the compact, sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitu-
tion of the United States," is incorrect.
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As part of its plenary legislative power over Puerto Rico, the United
States retains the exclusive right over military installations. This right
was evident in Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown. Puerto Rico had no option for
stopping damaging military exercises other than by suing in court, and
then only by alleging environmental harm." And even when it demon-
strated violation of environmental legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the denial of an injunction.Y
The United States' plenary rights over military use of Puerto Rico
was demonstrated as well in Feliciano v. United States. In that case the
District Court of Puerto Rico denied a requested injunction against the
U.S. President's designation as a "defensive sea area" of a sea sector off
Culebra, an offshore island of Puerto Rico.' 8 The President had forbidden
entrance into Culebra's territorial waters without authorization by the
Navy.9" Residents of Culebra sought the injunction to gain access without
Navy authorization, asserting that Navy denials prevented them from
earning a livelihood.100
The district court found the power of the United States to designate
a "defensive sea area" unlimited by any power of the government of Pu-
erto Rico. Even had Puerto Rico attempted legislatively to countermand
the designation, it could not have done so.101 The court found, moreover,
that the U.S. Congress has no power to divest itself of the right to make
military decisions affecting Puerto Rico, because of the Congress' power
over U.S. territory:
[A]s long as Puerto Rico remains a part of the United States, it would
probably be unconstitutional for Congress to allow Puerto Rico any
say whatever over maritime regulations involving national defense.'0 2
Puerto Rico has no voice in decisions regarding military operations in Pu-
erto Rico, since it has no voting representation in the U.S. Congress that
appropriates funds for the operations, 08 and no role in the electoral col-
lege that elects the president who carries them out.'04 Lack of Puerto
Rico representation in Congress also relieves the Defense Department of
pressure in Congress from Puerto Ricans whose lives are disrupted by
military activities. The Navy has acknowledged that one reason it con-
ducts weapons testing offshore from Puerto Rico is that Puerto Rico has
96. 478 F.Supp at 707.
97. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 305.
98. Executive Order No. 8684, Feb. 14, 1941, Federal Register, Feb. 18, 1941, at 1016.
99. Id.
100. Feliciano v. U.S., 297 F.Supp. at 1356.
101. Id. at 1361.
102. Id. at 1362.
103. It has a "resident commissioner" who participates in Congress on a non-voting
basis. 48 U.S.C. sec. 891, 5 U.S.C. sec. 2106. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 320-321.
104. U.S. CONST., art. II, sec. 1. Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution
and Statutes Are Applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?, in Proceedings of the
First Circuit Judicial Conference: Applicability of the United States Constitution and
Federal Laws to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Nov. 4-6, 1985, 110 F. R. D. 449, at 475.
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no representation in the United States Congress."0 5
2. Indigenous Constitution
"The associated territory should have the right to determine its in-
ternal constitution without outside interference," recites one of the Gen-
eral Assembly's criteria.'" The U.S. Congress, as indicated above, de-
manded changes as condition of its approval.'07 Among them was addition
of a provision to require that amendments conform to existing and future
Congressional legislation on Puerto Rico.'0 8 The Puerto Rico assembly
made the required changes and submitted them to a second referendum,
which approved them."0 9 Thus, amendments to the Puerto Rico Constitu-
tion must conform to whatever statutes Congress may enact on the Pu-
erto Rico-U.S. relationship."
Moreover, P.L. 600 gave Congress unlimited power to change Puerto
Rico statutory or constitutional law by stating that "the statutory laws of
the United States not locally inapplicable. . .shall have the same force
and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States.""' The U.S. represen-
tative to the General Assembly's Fourth Committee told the Committee
in 1953 that Puerto Rico's Constitution "stem[s] from their [the people of
Puerto Rico-J.Q.] own authority.""' 2 In fact, it stemmed from the U.S.
Congress. She further asserted that the Puerto Rico Constitution was a
document "which only they [the people of Puerto Rico-J.Q.] can alter or
amend."' 8 But the Puerto Rico Constitution is overridden by contrary
U.S. legislation.""
105. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 313.
106. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 88, Annex: Principle VII(b).
107. See supra note 83.
108. Pub. L. No. 477, 66 Stat. 327 (July 3, 1952).
109. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 33. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 79, 347. Reisman
finds the factor of U.S. approval of the Puerto Rico Constitution insignificant as part of "a
process in which there are two parties, for both of whom the contemplated relation must be
voluntary. Surely the principal may state the minima it will demand in the organization of
the associate." W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 44-45.
110. Garcia Mufliz, supra note 77, at 9. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 34. Amendments
do not, however, require prior approval of the U.S. Congress. Carri6n v. Gonzalez, 125
F.Supp. 819, 825-826 (U.S.D.C. D. P.R. 1954). Reisman ignores those limitations enumer-
ated in the text apart from U.S. approval and concludes that the relationship was voluntary.
111. Act, sec. 9, 48 U.S.C. sec. 34. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 36.
112. Statement of Frances Bolton, U.S. representative, Fourth Committee, Nov. 3,
1953, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL. 804 (1953), summarized in 8 U.N. GAOR C.4 (350th mtg.) at 225,
U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SER/350 (1953).
113. Id.
114. U.S. v. Quinofles, 758 F.2d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1985); U.S. v. P6rez, 465 F. Supp.
1284 (D. P.R. 1979). (In both cases, an accused, prosecuted in federal court, moved to sup-
press telephone conversation on grounds that the interception violated an anti-wiretap pro-
vision of the Puerto Rico Constitution. The interception was lawful under an Act of Con-
gress. Held: the Act of Congress prevails. The conversation may be used in evidence even if,
as the courts assumed, the interception violates the Puerto Rico Constitution.) In Figueroa
v. Puerto Rico, 232 F.2d 615, 620 (1st Cir. 1956), the First Circuit stated that the people of
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3. Freedom to Modify Status
Another factor established by the General Assembly is "the freedom
of the population of a Territory which has associated itself with the met-
ropolitan country to modify at any time this status through the expres-
sion of their will by democratic means."" 5 Resolution 748 mentioned a
"compact agreed upon with the United States of America."' A preambu-
lar clause indicates that the resolution was adopted
considering that the agreement reached by the United States of
America and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico... maintains the
spiritual bonds between Puerto Rico and Latin America." 7
As several United Nations members noted, however,"' there was no
"compact" in the sense of a bilateral agreement. P.L. 600, to be sure, re-
cited that it was "adopted in the nature of a compact,"' 9 and the Puerto
Rico Constitution referred to the relationship as based on a "compact."' 0
But neither term correctly characterized the post-1952 Puerto Rico-
United States relationship.
The U.S. Congress adopted P.L. 600 and gave the voters in Puerto
Rico a choice of approving or disapproving it on a take-it-or-leave-it ba-
sis. There was no agreement between Puerto Rico and the United
States.' 2 ' The absence of an agreement is further indicated by the fact
that twice since 1952 bills have been introduced in the U.S. Congress to
conclude such an agreement. Neither bill was adopted.'22
Puerto Rico were free to amend the Puerto Rico Constitution, if they were to decide to do
so, to delete from it the right to trial by jury. While the Court was to that extent correct, the
U.S. Congress has the right to require Puerto Rico to use trial by jury. Reisman construes
Figueroa as holding that if an Act of Congress conflicts with the Puerto Rico Constitution,
the Act would be "inapplicable." W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 36. Figueroa does not so
hold. Reisman construes to the same effect Moreno Rios v. U.S., 256 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1958).
Moreno Rios does not so hold either.
115. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 88, para. A(3). Similar language appears in G.A. Res.
1541, Annex: Principle VII(a), supra note 88.
116. G.A. Res. 748, supra note 78, para. 5.
117. Id., preambular para. 5.
118. Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 278.
119. 48 U.S.C. sec. 731b.
120. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO Rico CONST., art. 1, sec. 1, in Magruder, supra note 82,
at 21.
121. For a view that in Pub. L. No. 600 Congress ceded powers that it may not re-take,
thereby making the law a "compact," see Ortiz-Alvarez, The Compact between Puerto Rico
and the United States: Its Nature and Effects, REVISTA DE DERECHO PUERTORRIQUEIO, nos.
91-92, at 185-287 (1984-85). For a position that Congress did not give up its legal power over
Puerto Rico but created for itself a moral obligation not to intervene in Puerto Rican do-
mestic affairs, see Helfeld, Las Relaciones Constitucionales entre Puerto Rico y los Estados
Unidos, REVISTA DE DERECHO PUERTORRIQUE O, no. 93, at 297, 316 (1985); and to the same
effect, see Helfeld, in Proceedings of the First Circuit Judicial Conference, supra note 104,
at 465-466.
122. (1) H.R. 5945, Fernbs-Murray bill, 1959. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 82-84. (2) Pu-
erto Rican Compact: Hearing On the compact of Permanent Union between Puerto Rico
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A U.S. representative, endeavoring to convince the U. N. Committee
on Information from Non-Self Governing Territories that Puerto Rico
was self-governing, had told the Committee that a "compact" had been
concluded: "A compact, as you know, is far stronger than a treaty. A
treaty usually can be denounced by either side, whereas a compact cannot
be denounced by either party unless it has the permission of the
other."' Another U.S. representative had told the Fourth Committee
that the United States and Puerto Rico had "a compact of a bilateral
nature whose terms may be changed only by common consent."' 2
The U.S. representative to the General Assembly told that body of a
commitment by the U.S. President that "if, at any time, the Legislative
Assembly of Puerto Rico adopts a resolution in favor of more complete or
even absolute independence, he will immediately thereafter recommend
to Congress that such independence be granted."'2 5 No commitment was
made on behalf of the Congress; the intent behind the statement was to
lead Assembly delegates to believe that introduction of such a bill by the
President would result in favorable legislation. Thus, the statement, while
not false, was misleading."2 '
4. Free Expression of Opinion as to Status
Related to the freedom to modify status is another factor: "the opin-
ion of the population of the Territory, freely expressed by informed and
democratic process, as to the status or change in status which they de-
sire.""27 International supervision of status referenda has been deemed
necessary to guarantee fairness in ascertainment of opinion. 2 "
and the United States Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st sess. 47-87 (1975). Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 247-248.
123. Statement of Mason Sears, U.S. representative to U.N. Committee on Information
from Non-Self-Governing Territories, Aug. 28, 1953, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL. 392 (1953), quoted
in Mora v. Mejias, 115 F.Supp. 610, 612 (1953).
124. Statement of Bolton, supra note 112.
125. Statement of Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to U.N. General Assembly,
Nov. 27, 1953, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL. 841 (1953), summarized in 8 U.N. GAOR (459th mtg.)
para. 66, U.N. Doc. A/PV.459 (1953).
126. Reisman construes the statement as importing an obligation on the President,
binding under international law. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 45. Reisman misconstrues it
in the way the U.S. delegation apparently intended it to be misconstrued, stating that
"President Eisenhower's 1953 communication to the General Assembly made express, de-
spite equivocation, that Puerto Ricans could go their own way if and when they wanted to."
Id. at 118. The statement is also misconstrued as importing an agreement to grant indepen-
dence by R. TUGWELL, supra note 56, at 148, and by Crawford, who cites it for the proposi-
tion that "Puerto Rico has been regarded by the United States Government since 1952 as
entitled to opt for a different status-either complete independence or integration with the
United States." J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 372 (1979).
127. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 88, para. A(1).
128. Puerto Rico: Colony or Commonwealth, supra note 91, at 130-131. See, e.g., plebi-
scites organized by U.N. in Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons to determine
future status, mentioned in Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.),
Preliminary Objections, Dec. 2, 1963, 1963 I.C.J. 15, 23. Practice has also been for the Gen-
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In Puerto Rico, the 1952 referendum was not internationally super-
vised and did not include options involving less connection to the United
States than the one that carried a majority. The absence of international
supervision has been characterized as "only a formal flaw, since there ap-
pears to be no substantial criticism of the quality of the referendum con-
ducted."' 2 9 However, without international supervision one cannot be cer-
tain that possible defects were uncovered.
In 1967, the United States conducted in Puerto Rico a plebiscite on
status, also not internationally supervised. That plebiscite offered three
options: independence, status quo, or statehood (as a state of the United
States); 425,081 voted for the status quo, 273,315 for statehood, and 4204
for independence.8 0
It is questionable whether the 1967 plebiscite represents "the opinion
of the population.. .freely expressed," since: (1) there was no interna-
tional supervision; "8 (2) the United States had not promised to abide by
the most popular choice, which must have made voting for "indepen-
dence" seem a wasted vote; 3 2 (3) expression of opinion is not free so long
as Puerto Rico is occupied by a large U.S. military force, viewed as an
intimidating factor;'38 (4) no option of true "free association" was on the
ballot, since the status quo fell short of "free association." 4
Pro-independence forces boycotted the plebiscite, "' arguing that the
United States must first transfer power to local authority, so that the
people could choose status without the pressure of U.S. presence.' 6 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation, considering most of the pro-indepen-
dence groups "subversive," tried to undermine this boycott by disrupting
these groups.13 7 The boycott nonetheless apparently achieved some suc-
eral Assembly to approve the plebiscite after determining that it was fairly conducted. Id.
129. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 44.
130. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1967, at Al, col. 1.
131. See, eg., plebiscite conducted under United Nations observation in Palau in 1986
to decide on future status. U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, at 93, (April 1986).
132. Berrios Martinez, supra note 91, at 15. "[B]efore the Puerto Ricans can possibly
take a significant constitutional initiative, they must be given explicit and detailed guaran-
tees about the possible political responses from Washington in the event particular options
are chosen." Cabranes, in Proceedings of the First Circuit Judicial Conference, supra note
104, at 484.
133. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 314. Martinez, supra note 91, at 15.
134. Mufliz, supra note 77, at 62. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 88.
135. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1967, at Al, col. 1.
136. Mufiz, supra note 77, at 63. Withey, Puerto Rico and the United Nations 1977, 1
PUERTO RICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12, 14 (1977). R. CARR, supra note 40, at 89.
137. Berrios Martinez, supra note 91, at 15. Gautier Mayoral, La Elevaci6n del Caso de
Puerto Rico ante la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en ta Decada Actual, 45
REVISTA DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE P.R. 69, 77 (1984). See, e.g., F.B.I. memorandum
describing a plan, based on information that an official of one pro-independence group had
called an official of another pro-independence group "a coward," to compose and send a
flyer to members of the Movement for the Independence of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rican
Socialist League, and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico stating, "You have two weeks to
prove or retract your statement that [name deleted in version released] is a coward." The
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cess, as 34% of eligible voters did not cast ballots. s3 That represented a
30% higher abstention rate than in general elections in Puerto Rico.139
The F.B.I. efforts cast further doubt on whether the plebiscite repre-
sented a free expression of opinion.
On the basis of the 1967 plebiscite, the United States moved in the
U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization, which by then had taken up
the question of whether Puerto Rico remained non-self-governing, to re-
move Puerto Rico from its agenda. But the Special Committee postponed
indefinitely a vote on that motion, apparently disagreeing with the U.S.
position that the plebiscite had provided an adequate opportunity for
Puerto Rico to determine its status."1 0
C. United Nations Re-Consideration of Puerto Rico's Status
In the 1970s, the United Nations' Special Committee on Decoloniza-
tion has characterized Puerto Rico in terms that suggest non-self-gov-
erning status. "1 In 1972 it "recogniz[ed] the inalienable right of the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico to self-determination and independence." '142 The
General Assembly approved the work of the Committee, an action that
endorsed the Committee's finding on Puerto Rico." '4 In 1973 the Special
Committee
request[ed] the Government of the United States of America to re-
frain from taking any measures which might obstruct the full and free
exercise by the people of their inalienable right to self-determination
and independence.
1 4
4
The General Assembly again approved the report. 4"
In 1978 the Special Committee "[a]ffirm[ed] that self-determination
by the people of Puerto Rico in a democratic process should be exercised
memorandum recited: "it is believed this flyer will further the conflict between the groups
there by diverting their energies from the issue of the upcoming plebiscite." Memorandum,
June 16, 1967, to F.B.I. Director, from Special Agent in Charge [of the F.B.I.], San Juan
[Puerto Rico], re "Groups Seeking Independence for Puerto Rico, Counterintelligence Pro-
gram (Subversive Control Section)," in Scholarly Resources, (Wilmington, Delaware),
Cointelpro: The Counterintelligence Program of the F.B.I. (microfilm), File No. 105-93124,
Nationalist Groups, Reel 1 (1978).
138. Total number of eligible voters was 1,067,000. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1967, at Al,
col. 1.
139. Id. at A18, col. 1.
140. Gautier Mayoral, supra note 137, at 77.
141. Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 278-279. Axtmayer, supra note 74, at 252-253.
142. Aug. 28, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/419 (1972) (Vote: 12-0-10).
143. G.A. Res. 2908, para. 3 (Nov. 2, 1972), 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/8730 (1973) (Vote: 99-5-23). Withey, supra note 136, at 14-15; Mufiiz, supra note 77,
at 146-147. "Approval of the Special Committee's report signifies approval of its determina-
tions and recommendations." Puerto Rico: Colony or Commonwealth, supra note 91, at 120.
144. Resolution, Aug. 30, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/438 (1973) (Vote: 12-2-9). See also
Garcia Mufiiz, supra note 77, at 128-129; Withey, supra note 136, at 15.
145. G.A. Res. 3163, art. 2, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc
A/9030 (1974) (Vote: 104-5-19).
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through mechanisms freely selected by the Puerto Rican people in com-
plete and full sovereignty." 46 In 1982 it
reaffirm[ed] the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-
determination and independence and urged once again the Govern-
ment of the United States to adopt all necessary measures for the full
and effective transfer of all sovereign powers to the people of Puerto
Rico.147
In 1985 it expressed the hope that Puerto Rico might exercise its right to
self-determination and independence "without hindrance" and "with the
express recognition of the people's sovereignty and full political
equality."148
The Special Committee in 1981 asked the General Assembly to "ex-
amine the question of Puerto Rico, 1 49 but the Assembly declined, follow-
ing objection by the United States'3 0 that included threats of economic
assistance cuts to member states.'5
D. Conclusion as to Status of Puerto Rico
The 1950-52 legislation effected no fundamental change in the
Puerto Rico-United States relationship. It increased Puerto Rico's control
over internal affairs "within the established colonial system.
1 52
146. Resolution, para. 3 (Sept. 12, 1978), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/574 (1978). Vote: 10-0-12.
In 1979 the Special Committee, referring back to the resolutions cited in the text "[n]ot[ed]
with preoccupation that so far the Government of the United States has not taken any
concrete steps to comply with the mandate of the above-mentioned resolutions with respect
to Puerto Rico, including, inter alia, the complete transfer of all powers to the people of the
said Territory, and urge[d] that concrete measures be taken in that direction without fur-
ther delay." Resolution, para. 2, Aug. 15, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/589 (1979) (Vote: 11-0-
12).
147. Resolution, para. 1 (Aug. 4, 1982), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/707 (1982) (Vote: 12-2-9).
Identical language appears in Resolution, paras. 1-2, (Aug. 24, 1983), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/
751 (1983), reported in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, at 83 (Jan. 1984) (Vote: 10-2-10).
148. Resolution, para. 2 (Aug. 14, 1985), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/844 (1985), reported in
U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, at 14 (July-Aug 1985) (Vote: 11-1-10).
149. Resolution, para. 3 (Aug. 20, 1981), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/677 (1981), reported in
1981 U.N.Y.B. 1113-1114 (Vote: 11-2-11).
150. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 363. Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Nov. 20, 1981), U.N. Doc. A/36/L/
20 (approval of Special Committee resolution that included request for General Assembly
consideration of Puerto Rico question on understanding that Assembly would not examine
Puerto Rico question). A vote against inclusion of Puerto Rico question on Assembly agenda
was taken Sept. 24, 1982 (Vote: 70-30-43). 1982 U.N.Y.B. 1276; Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1982,
at Al, col. 2.
151. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 363. Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1982, at A10, col. 1 (quoting
U.S. Deputy Representative Kenneth Adelman that U.S. mission had indicated to states
considering abstention that abstention "would be unfavorably met in bilateral relations and
on Capitol Hill.")
152. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine (Book Review) 100
HARV. L. REV. 450, 460 (1986) (reviewing J. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO
Rico: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985)). To the same effect, see Rodriguez-
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The legislative history of P.L. 600 indicates an intent to retain in the
U.S. Congress the power unilaterally to modify Puerto Rico's status. 
1 5 3
The State Department told Congress that P.L. 600 would have "great
value as a symbol" in response to" 'colonialism' and 'imperialism' in anti-
American propaganda."'" The Secretary of the Interior, seeking to assure
Congress that under P.L. 600 it would retain control over Puerto Rico,
stated that it "would not change Puerto Rico's political, social, and eco-
nomic relationship to the United States.'
'5 5
"The island's basic political status has not changed since the turn of
the century."'" "No word other than 'colonialism,'" states one commen-
tator regarding the United States and Puerto Rico, "describes the rela-
tionship between a powerful metropolitan state and an impoverished
overseas dependency disenfranchised from the formal lawmaking
processes that shape its people's daily lives.1
1 5
For Puerto Rico, "[i]nternal autonomy is restricted, especially in leg-
islative and judicial matters."' 58Puerto Rico is "still subject to the laws
and regulations adopted by the political branches of the national govern-
ment before which they appear only as supplicants; and that national
government retains virtually unlimited discretion to determine whether
or how the island will fit into national policy."' 1 '
The fact that Puerto Rico remains non-self-governing means that the
military use of Puerto Rico remains a violation of the United States' "sa-
cred trust" obligation.
V. STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF AN ADMINISTERING STATE FOR UNLAWFUL
MILITARY BASES IN A NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORY
A variety of harms may befall a non-self-governing territory from
military use of it by an administering state.
A. Risk of Becoming a Military Target
Military use of a non-self-governing territory makes that territory a
Orellana, supra note 85, at 462-463.
153. TORRUELLA, supra note 83, at 155-159.
154. Letter to Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Senate, from
Jack K. McFall, Asst. Secretary of State (for the Secretary of State), Apr. 24, 1950, 81st
Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 2688, 2689.
155. Letter to Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Senate, from
Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior, May 19, 1950, id. at 2685. For views to the
same effect of other executive branch and Congressional sources, see Cabranes, Puerto Rico
and the Constitution, in Proceedings of the First Circuit Judicial Conference, supra note
104, at 483.
156. Cabranes, supra note 152, at 461.
157. Cabranes, in Proceedings of the First Circuit Judicial Conference, supra note 104,
at 480.
158. CRAWFORD, supra note 126, at 372.
159. Cabranes, supra note 152, at 461.
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potential target in a military confrontation of the administering state
with other states. Puerto Rico is particularly at risk because of the impor-
tance of the installations to defense of the United States.
The existence and moveability of nuclear weapons poses a special
risk to non-self-governing territories. United States vessels with nuclear
armaments dock in Puerto Rico. This makes Puerto Rico a potential nu-
clear target.16 0 A 1967 treaty established a nuclear-free zone in Latin
America and the Caribbean to keep the region free of nuclear war. 6 ' The
treaty prohibits "receipt" or "possession" of nuclear weapons."6
B. Potential for Offensive Use
Military bases subject a non-self-governing territory to the possibility
that aggressive attacks may be launched against other states. Aggression
was launched from Puerto Rican bases in 1983 against Grenada. 1 3 The
General Assembly has asked administering states "not to involve those
Territories in any offensive acts or interference against other States."'"
The Special Committee on Decolonization
deplor[ed] the decision of the United States to enlarge and reinforce
its military installations in Puerto Rico and establish new facilities, as
well as the increasing militarization of the United States National
Guard in Puerto Rico and its participation in United-States sponsored
manoeuvres in Central America.'66
C. Displacement of Economic Activity and Population
The General Assembly has "deprecat[ed] the continued alienation of
land in colonial Territories for military installations.""6 Land use for ba-
ses has displaced residents and agriculture in Puerto Rico. The bases oc-
cupy 13% of Puerto Rico's arable land."6" Many farmers have lost their
livelihood; 60% the population has received food stamps in recent
years.
16
Objecting in 1948 to the establishment of bases on Vieques Island,
U.S. Rep. Vito Marcantonio said:
160. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 314.
161. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, (Treaty of
Tlatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967, entered into force Dec. 31, 1979, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, reprinted in 6
ILM 521 (1967).
162. Id., art. 1, sec. 1. The United States is a party to Additional Protocol I, which
requires application of art. 1 of the Treaty in territories for which it is internationally re-
sponsible. Additional Protocol I, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 10147, 634 U.N.T.S. 361.
163. See supra note 71; Quigley, supra note 69, at 271-352.
164. G.A. Res. 41/405, supra note 31, para. 2.
165. Resolution, Aug. 24, 1983, supra note 147, para 5.
166. G.A. Res. 41/405, supra note 31, para. 11.
167. Independencia, Newsletter of the Puerto Rico Subcommittee, National Lawyers
Guild, 1986, at 7.
168. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 215.
VOL. 16:2,3
LEGALITY OF MILITARY BASES IN PUERTO RICO
The United States is depopulating the Puerto Rican island of Vieques
and turning it into a military training base. .... Vieques is a fertile
spot. .... Despite the frantic opposition of the Puerto Ricans, the
Navy has already ordered the complete evacuation of the inhabitants
of Vieques by the early part of this year. This order will affect some
5,000 people and will cripple an agricultural economy which supported
4 sugar mills-producing 20,000 tons of sugar annually-and an ex-
tensive grazing industry. To the people of Puerto Rico who do not
have nearly enough arable land to support their dense population the
removal of Vieques as a source of agricultural products is a national
calamity.8 9
Weapons firings on Vieques Island have removed most of its land area
from productive agriculture. The U.S. Court of Appeals found that
"[slince the mid 1940's. . .the sugar cane industry [on Vieques Island]
has declined to a point where it is of no current importance to the is-
land.' 1 70 As a result, the Court stated, "the islanders now derive their
livelihood from the same sources relied upon by their ancestors more than
one hundred fifty years ago-fishing, subsistence farming and ranching.
17
D. Disruption of Economic Activity
In Puerto Rico, economic activity is hampered by military opera-
tions. The United States Navy operates its Atlantic Fleet Weapons
Training Facility from Roosevelt Roads and from Vieques Island. 7 If its
training, which employs an electromagnetic field, were conducted in the
United States, the Navy acknowledges, it would interfere with television
signals for many residents.'
The Navy typically conducts weapons firing 200 days per year. 4 The
U.S. Supreme Court found that "[d]uring air-to-ground training.. .pilots
sometimes miss land-based targets, and ordnance falls into the sea. That
is, accidental bombings of the navigable waters and, occasionally, inten-
tional bombings of water targets occur.'
7 5
That training has engendered local protest because of disruption to
economic activities, particularly fishing.171 Protests were directed at dis-
ruption caused by weapons exercises, as mentioned, on Culebra Island.1
7 7
169. 94 CONG. REC. 9283 (1948). On previous economic activity on Vieques, see also
Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 20.
170. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d at 838.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 838-839.
173. R. CARR, supra note 40 at 311 (citing his interview with Chief of Staff, Roosevelt
Roads Naval Base). On the electronic warfare range, see also Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643
F.2d at 839.
174. Romero-BarceI6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d at 839.
175. Weinberger, v. Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 307.
176. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 311-313. Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 16-23.
177. Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Internationaux, 75 REvuE GtkN9RALE DE Dsorr IN-
TERNATIONAL PUBLIC 465, 521-523 (1971). See also supra note 100.
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In 1975 the Navy stopped the firings on Culebra Island."'
According to Carlos Zenon, President of the Vieques Fishermen's As-
sociation, which has been prominent in protests, these exercises "destroy
fish and fishing equipment. Our lives are in constant danger, due to unex-
ploded bombs in the water."' 79 Many Vieques fishermen had to quit fish-
ing: "we have to go to the Food Stamp lines."' 80 The United Nations Spe-
cial Committee on Decolonization
demand[ed] that the armed forces of the United States terminate per-
manently their operations in the island municipality of Vieques, thus
allowing the people of that island to live in peace in their own land
and to enjoy fully the results of the exploitation for their benefit of
the natural resources in the land and sea of the island municipality.' 8'
E. Damage to the Environment
Base use may damage the environment. Judge Torruella found (and
the U.S. Supreme Court did not question) that the Navy had violated
environmental protection laws in its weapons firing on Vieques Island.'82
The Court of Appeals ordered issuance of an injunction to the Navy to
cease these violations until it obtained statutorily-required permits.'
The Court of Appeals found that the Navy had, before firing weapons
around Vieques Island, failed to secure a biological opinion on the impact
on various endangered species, including pelicans, turtles, and
manatees.""
F. Possible Benefits to the Non-Self-Governing Territory
Even if an administering state uses a non-self-governing territory for
military purposes of its own, benefit may accrue to the non-self-governing
territory. The United States' military use of Puerto Rico provides em-
ployment for Puerto Ricans. Judge Torruella said, in explaining the im-
portance of keeping sea lanes open, that "the ability to maintain free sea
lanes to and from the Mainland [of the United States] would seem of
some interest to the residents of this Commonwealth.' ' 85 The governor of
Puerto Rico said in 1982 that the Roosevelt Roads base "boosts island
178. Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Internationaux, in 78 REVUE GIkNIkRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1096, 1183 (1974). Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 22. See also
Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d at 839.
179. Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 17. See also id. at 18. Zenon was a plaintiff
in suit accompanying that of Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 650.
180. Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 18.
181. Resolution, para. 6, Aug. 15, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/589 (1979).
182. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 309-310.
183. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d at 837.
184. Id. at 857. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court had
discretion to refuse an injunction, even in the face of statutory violations. Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 311.
185. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 707, n. 119.
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security.""18 Where an administering state operates military bases for its
own benefit, however, benefits to the non-self-governing territory are inci-
dental. The administering state is using the non-self-governing territory
for its own purposes.
G. Bases as an Impediment to Self-Determination
Military use of a non-self-governing territory may affect the adminis-
tering state's promotion of self-determination. The General Assembly, as
noted, characterizes military bases as an "obstacle" to self-determina-
tion.187 The military significance of Puerto Rico influences United States
policy as to its status.' In 1943 the Puerto Rico legislature asked for a
referendum on independence:
The colonial system of government ought to be totally and definitely
abolished in Puerto Rico, and the form of this definite political status
ought to be democratically decided through the free vote of the people
themselves. 18
A bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate to grant independence; but it
stipulated that the United States was to maintain the right to its bases.'90
One senator stated that Puerto Rico must, as a condition of indepen-
dence, give guarantees "as to military and naval installations and means
of egress and ingress."'' The Navy Department opposed independence
without guarantees for "retention of naval and military and air bases and
reservations by the United States and for such expansion of naval and
military and air facilities as may be required in the future for hemisphere
defense." ' 2
Objecting to independence, the War Department stated: "For mili-
tary reasons, we believe that would be unwise."'8 3 One senator opposed
independence even with guarantees:
I can understand a certain amount of autonomy, but I cannot under-
stand how you can reconcile complete independence of the Island with
the effective and necessary use of Puerto Rico for a military control of
the Caribbean." 4
The United States' hostile relationship with Cuba has solidified its
position that it must keep Puerto Rico as a military outpost. 9 " Antici-
186. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 315 (quoting Feb. 1, 1982, speech of Gov. Romero-
Barcel6).
187. See supra note 31.
188. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 311.
189. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1943, at 6, col. 4. THE PUERTO RiCANS, supra note 37, at 190.
190. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1943, at 7, col. 1.
191. Hearings on S. 952, supra note 39, at 20 (statement of Senator Bone).
192. Id. at 41-42 (statement of Capt. Paul Foster, Navy Dept.).
193. Id. at 10 (statement of John McCloy, Asst. Secretary of War).
194. Id. at 15 (statement of Senator Taft).
195. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 310.
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pated removal of United States bases from Panama in the year 2000
heightened the perception that Puerto Rico is important in United States
military strategy: "the U.S. military's growing interest in Puerto Rico
stems from the pending removal of U.S. military operations in the Canal
Zone."' 9 Finally, the increasing sophistication of weaponry has rendered
Puerto Rico useful, as indicated, as a test firing site. 19 7
Bases are a sector not controlled by nascent self-governing institu-
tions. Whatever portion of a non-self-governing territory is devoted to
military use is outside the reach of those institutions.
Bases may skew the economy to the extent that whatever self-gov-
erning authority emerges may find it difficult to administer the domestic
economy.198 Finally, the presence of a significant military apparatus may
intimidate the people of a non-self-governing territory in expressing their
opinions on territorial status.
H. Obligation to Make Restitution and Compensation
Military use of a non-self-governing territory violates the rights of
the people of that territory, giving rise to state responsibility.19 9 The stan-
dard for state responsibility is that an administering state must restore
the status quo before the breach and, to the extent this is not possible,
compensate for harm.'0 A "people," even one that has not achieved self-
determination, can carry rights and bear obligations under international
law.2 '01 In Puerto Rico, the United States is obliged to remove its bases,
return the land to its owners, and compensate for damage to individu-
als.20 2 Compensation should be sufficient to make farmers, fishingpeople,
196. Lidin, Navy's Signal Tower for Carib Upgraded, San Juan Star, May 6, 1983, at 1,
col. 1. Reisman questioned the military importance of Puerto Rico to the United States, W.
REISMAN, supra note 83, at 118, as did former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, quoted in
Friedman, P.R. Not Vital to Security of U.S., Kissinger Says, San Juan Star, March 16,
1981, at 3, col. 3.
197. See supra note 63.
198. See, e.g., the situation in South Vietnam after 1975, where previous dependency of
the economy on the U.S. military made economic management difficult. J. QUIGLEY, Viet-
nam's First Modern Penal Code 9 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL J. INT'L. & COMP. L. (1988).
199. On state responsibility, see generally C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928); I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS-STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY PART 1 (1983); Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission to the General Assembly, 35 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10), at 59,
U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1980/Add.1, part 2 (1980); Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in
the Law of State Responsibility, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77-131 (1986).
200. C. EAGLETON, supra note 199, at 182. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w
(Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. ser. A No. 13, at 47
(Judgement of Sept. 13), reprinted in 1 M. Hudson, WORLD COURT REPORTS 578, at 677-678
(1922-26).
201. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Re-
quest for Advisory Opinion), 1971 I.C.J. 31, para. 52.
202. See resolution of the Puerto Rican Bar Association making these three points.
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and others whole for their losses. Fixing monetary compensation for dam-
age to the environment will be difficult.
I. Procedure for Effectuating Restitution and Compensation
Were the United States to grant Puerto Rico self-governing status, as
it is also obliged to do under international law, then it could negotiate
with a Puerto Rican government for continued military use. It could ne-
gotiate return of land and compensation to individuals. Third-party arbi-
tration might provide a method of evaluating claims.
The mechanism would vary depending on the form of self-determina-
tion chosen by the people of Puerto Rico-whether integration into the
United States, a status of free association, or independence. Without at-
tainment by Puerto Rico of self-determination, no entity can represent it
vis-a-vis the United States.
So long as a territory remains non-self-governing, its only protection
comes from United Nations supervision over the administering state.
With Puerto Rico, as indicated, the Special Committee on Decolonization
has noted problems created by United States military bases. But the
General Assembly has not addressed the issue of those bases. The United
States has been able to prevent the Assembly from exercising
supervision.1
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VI. CONCLUSION
The "sacred trust" norm protects the right of a people to achieve
self-determination. Military bases for an administering state's benefit in a
non-self-governing territory may cause significant hardship and may pre-
vent a people from achieving self-determination.
A non-self-governing people is unable to protect itself from an ad-
ministering state. The international community must take seriously its
obligation of supervision over administering states, to ensure that mili-
tary bases do not cause present harm and that they do not jeopardize
achievement of self-determination.
Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, Comisi6n para el Estudio del Sistema Constitucional
de Puerto Rico, Informe de 1980 para el Comitk de DescolonizaciOn de las Naciones
Unidas, Aug. 15, 1980, in 47 Revista del Colegio de Abogados de P.R. 281 (1986).
203. See supra note 150.
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